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CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES RESEARCH LAB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

ISSUE: WHAT COURSE OF ACTION MAY OR MUST THE TRIAL CHAMBER
TAKE IF, AT THE END OF THE TRIAL, IT IS NOT SATISFIED THAT ALL OF
THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED HAVE BEEN PROVEN BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT BUT IT IS SATISFIED THAT THE EVIDENCE PROVES
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF A DIFFERENT,
BUT RELATED, CRIME.

Prepared by Traci M. Donovan
Spring 2006

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. ISSUE*
This memorandum addresses what the Trial Chamber of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (the “Special Court”) may or must do when the facts proven at trial support
a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt for a crime not pled in the indictment that is
different or related to the crime charged.
B. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Where the principle of iura juris novit is recognized, the parties to the
proceedings “do not have to provide legal evidence in the process. At the same time the
court, in order to reach a final decision, is able to pursue any piece of legal matter which
it considers necessary, whether it has been forward by the parties or not.”1 This principle
is used in many international proceedings, however, when it is applied in international
criminal proceedings, it is done so on a very limited basis.
1. International Systems
There is overwhelming support for the application of the principle of iura novit
curia in international courts. As authority for the application of the principle of iura

* Suppose that at the end of a trial, the trial chamber is not satisfied that all of the elements of the crime
charged have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Suppose, however, that the trial chamber is satisfied
that the evidence does prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of a different (related) crime,
with which the accused has not been charged. What course of action may/must the trial chamber take in
these circumstances? Please consider, with reference to both international criminal law and national legal
systems.
In answering this question, it may be useful to have regard to paragraph 866 of the Celebici Trial
Judgement of 16 November 1998 (Prosecutor v. Delalic et al) (concerning lesser included offences), and
the civil law principle of iura novit curia (see, for instance, the Kupreskic Trial Judgement of 14 January
2000, paras. 740-748).
1

Gema Marcilla Cordoba, Iura Novit Curia, Law Crisis and the European Building Process, University of
Catilla-La Mancha, Spain, available at
http://www.udg.es/dretprivat/filosofia/Pon%C3%A8ncies_II/Gema_Marcilla.rtf [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook, Tab 44].

novit curia, the European Court of Human Rights (the “European Court”), the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (the “Inter-American Court”), and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the “ICTY”) cite the Permanent Court of
International Justice’s use of the principle for its use in international law.
For example, the European Court is permitted to consider legal arguments not
raised by the parties2 but it is not obligated to do so.3 If the European Commission on
Human Rights (the “Commission”) found that a particular allegation of a violation of the
European Convention on Human Rights (the “European Convention”) was inadmissible,
the European Court was still able to consider a violation of the European Convention
despite the Commission’s determination.4 The Inter-American Court applies the
principle of iura novit curia; however, this court has consistently held that, in order to
fulfill its proper function, it is obligated to apply iura novit curia and therefore it must
consider if there were violations that were not alleged by the parties.5
On the other hand, the principle of iura novit curia is not often applied in ICTY
proceedings. In fact, the ICTY questioned whether the principle should apply to
international criminal proceedings at all.6 This is significant because, while there is

2

See Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser B) No. 3 (1961) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab
24].
3

See Contrada v. Italy, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 17].

4

See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab
22].
5

See Durand and Ugarte Case, Judgment of August 1 6, 2000, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 68 (2000)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 18].
6

Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, IT-95-16-T, para. 723 (Jan. 14, 2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook,
Tab 28].

2

overwhelming support for the use of the principle in the European Court and the InterAmerican Court, these courts are not criminal courts.
The most important reason to prohibit criminal courts from finding violations of
crimes not pled in the indictment is that a defendant has a right to promptly be informed
of the charges against him. If criminal courts permit the prosecutor to allege criminal
violations not pled in the original indictment, the defendant may not be able to properly
or adequately prepare his defense. The application of the principal of iura novit curia in
criminal courts poses a serious danger because the defendants are accused of criminal
acts which carry penalties of imprisonment. Moreover, in international criminal tribunals
like the Special Court, the defendant is charged with violations of international criminal
law and/or violations of certain domestic criminal laws.
Finally, the Trial Chamber in Kupreskic indicated that an accused may not be
convicted of charges not pled in the indictment.7 Should the prosecutor wish to add a
different crime based on the facts of the case, he should request leave to amend the
indictment.8 However, a defendant may be convicted of a lesser included crime that was
not formally charged in the indictment because the elements are the same and therefore
the defendant was put on notice from the original indictment and he had ample time to
prepare his defense.9
2. National Systems

7

Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, IT-95-16-T, para. 748 (Jan. 14, 2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook,
Tab 28].
8

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

9

Id. at 745. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].
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National systems vary on the application of the principle of iura novit curia,
which is due, in large part, to the differences between the roles of the judiciaries in civil
law and common law systems. In civil law countries the judges also play the role of factfinder. These judges participate in the investigation process. They are responsible for
introducing and finding evidence and they decide what evidence should be used for both
sides. In most civil law countries, if the judge determines that there is a different crime
or more serious crime that should be added to the charges, the prosecutor must give the
defendant prompt notice in order to prepare his defense in response to the new charges.10
Common law countries do not permit the judges to raise or consider legal
arguments that the parties have not brought before the court. In general, judges may give
the prosecutors leave to amend the charges and notice must be given to the defendant.11
The defendant must have sufficient time to answer those charges.12 An exception to this
general rule is found in the United States and the United Kingdom, which permit the
conviction of an accused on lesser included offenses even when not charged in the
indictment. In such cases, leave to amend is not necessary.13
II. BACKGROUND
Formerly a British colony, Sierra Leone gained its independence from the United
Kingdom in 1961.14 Since that time, the government of Sierra Leone was corrupt and

10

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 3, 7 (2006). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 6].

11

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(e) (2006). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 6].

12

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 6]; See CRIMINAL LAW ACT OF
1967, SECTION 6(3) (U.K.). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 5].
13

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 6].

14

Celina Schocken, Note, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and Recommendations, 20
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 436, 437 (2002). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 41].
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mismanaged.15 In March 1991, the Rebel United Front (the “RUF”) entered Sierra Leone
and months later, front line soldiers overthrew the president of Sierra Leone, Joseph
Momoh.16 Those former front line soldiers entered into peace talks with the RUF, but
they were to no avail.17 Starting in March 1991, over 400,000 people had limbs
amputated and thousands of children were murdered, raped, or forced into service as
soldiers.18 As a response to atrocities committed during the civil war, the Government of
Sierra Leone and United Nations jointly established the Special Court for Sierra Leone to
punish those responsible for the most egregious human rights violations.19 The Special
Court has jurisdiction to over international humanitarian law violations and certain
domestic Sierra Leonean laws.20
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. INTERNATIONAL COURTS
1. International Criminal Courts
a. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Article 14 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone states that the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the
“ICTR”) “shall be applicable mutatis mutandis to the conduct of the legal proceedings

15

Id. at 438. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 41].

16

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 41].

17

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 41].

18

Id. at 436. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 41].

19

Id. at 437. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 41].

20

Laura Dickinson, Note, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 A.J.I.L. 295, 300 (2003). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook, Tab 42].
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before the Special Court.”21 Article 14 of the Statute of the ICTR applies the rules of the
ICTY mutatis mutandis.22 Therefore, the judgments of the ICTY concerning the rules of
procedure and evidence are crucial to applying and interpreting the rules of procedure
and evidence for the Special Court.
The most important case from the ICTY touching this issue is Prosecutor v.
Kupreskic.23 In that case, the Trial Chamber specifically stated the steps the prosecutor
must take if she failed to allege a crime which, during the course of the trial, she
discovers would amount to a violation of a crime over which the Tribunal has
jurisdiction.24 In its discussion, the Trial Chamber noted that the Statute of the ICTY
permits cumulative charges and alternative verdicts.25 For example, while specific acts
may constitute more than one crime, the prosecutor should allege violations of all crimes
it considers may have been committed even when the facts may only prove that one has
actually been violated.26 Further, this practice is like a “catch all” so that even if a

21

Statute of Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 14 [hereinafter referred to as the Statute of the SCSL].
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 12].
“The judges of the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall adopt, for the purpose of proceedings before
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, the rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial
phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and
witnesses and other appropriate matters of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with such
changes as they deem necessary.” Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by Security
Council on November 8, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, art. 14 (1994), available at http://www/ictr.org
[hereinafter referred to as the ICTR Statute] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 10].
22

23

Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, IT-95-16-T (Jan. 14, 2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

24

Id. at 742-743. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

25

Id. at 727. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

26

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

6

specific crime alleged is not proven, the facts may support a conviction on a different or
lesser included offense.27
The Trial Chamber specifically noted that “at least for the time being it is
questionable that the iura novit curia principle . . . fully applies in international criminal
proceedings.”28 In assessing whether iura novit curia should be applied, the Trial
Chamber discussed two competing interests – the right of the accused to be informed of
the charges against him so as to prepare his defense and the right of the prosecutor to
efficiently fulfill his mission.29 On the one hand, the ICTY Statute provides the
defendant with the right to be apprised of the charges against him and the legal
characterization of the facts.30 On the other hand, the prosecutor is responsible for
prosecuting violations of humanitarian law.

27

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

28

Id. at 743. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

29

Id. at 724. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

“In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall
be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (a) to be informed promptly and in detail
in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him; (b) to have adequate
time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
(c) to be tried without undue delay; (d) to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this
right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and
without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it; (e) to examine,
or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on
his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; and (f) to have the free assistance of an
interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in the International Tribunal.” Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at
36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by Security Council on 25 May 1993, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827, art. 21(4) (1993) [hereinafter referred to as ICTY Statute]. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook, Tab 11].
30

7

According to the Trial Chamber, the most appropriate way to reconcile these
interests is as follows:31 If the prosecutor determines that more than one provision of the
ICTY Statute is violated by the same facts charged, she may make cumulative charges in
the indictment. However it is preferred that, if possible, the prosecutor should charge in
the alternative, which may depend on the elements the prosecutor is able to prove.
Therefore, the more serious offense should be charged in the indictment and the
indictment must also state that if that crime is not proved, the lesser charge may be
proved.32 If the prosecutor charges the accused of a “special” crime, an alternative
violation of “broader provision” may also be alleged “so that if the evidence turns out to
be insufficient with regard to the special provision (the lex specialis) , it may still be
found compelling with respect to a violation of the broader provision (the lex
generalis).33 The Trial Chamber recommended that the prosecutor “should refrain as
much as possible from making charges based on the same facts[.]”34
It may turn out that the prosecutor wrongly classified the facts and a crime was
not charged but the evidence demonstrates that the uncharged crime was committed.35
According to the Trial Chamber, to permit a conviction on that basis would not
adequately protect the rights of the accused because he “would not be able to prepare his
defence with a well-defined charge.”36 The Court stated:

31

Kupreskic, at 727. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

32

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

33

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

34

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

35

IId. at 728. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

36

Id. at 740. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].
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even though the iura novit curia principle is normally applied in
international judicial proceedings, under present circumstances it would be
inappropriate for this principle to be followed in proceedings before
international criminal courts, where the rights of the accused are at stake.
It would also violate Article 22(4)(a) of the Statute, which provides that an
accused shall be informed “promptly and in detail” of the “nature and
cause of the charge against him.”37
The Statute for the Special Court has an identical provision which provides that the
accused is guaranteed the right “to be informed promptly and in detail in a language
which he or she understand of the nature and cause of the charge against him or her.”38
If, during the trial, the prosecutor discovers that a different offense (with different
elements) not charged in the indictment has been proved, he should request leave to
amend the indictment.39 If the prosecutor concludes that a more serious offense has been
committed then he must also request leave to amend the indictment so the defendant may
prepare his defense.40
If the offense is a lesser included offense not charged in the indictment but the
facts during trial support such a charge, the prosecutor is not required to amend the
indictment because “the accused has been given the opportunity to contest all the
elements of the crime charged. If one of the elements is lacking, this does not entail that
the crime has not been committed, provided all the elements of the lesser included
offense are proven.”41 The prosecutor should nevertheless “give prompt notice” to the

37

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

38

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 17. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab12].

39

Kupreskic, at 746. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

40

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

41

Id. at 743. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].
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defendant that a lesser crime is alleged so “the acused [sic] may know the particulars of
the case against him or her.”42
In Prosecutor v. Delalic, defendants Delic and Landzo were charged with willful
killing and murder.43 The evidence did not support a conviction on that basis; however,
the facts proved at trial established their guilt for “wilfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health, a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
punishable under Article 2 of the Statute, and cruel treatment, a violation of the laws or
customs of war punishable under Article 3 of the Statute.”44 The Trial Chamber stated
that “it is a principle of law that a grave offence includes a lesser offence of the same
nature.”45
While the Trial Chamber declared that it is uncertain whether the principle of iura
novit curia fully applies in the context of international criminal proceedings, it is applied
by the ICTY in a limited manner. For example, in Delalic, the prosecution requested
leave to call an additional expert witness after being apprised of new facts.46 The Trial
Chamber ordered that the prosecution give notice to the defendant and an oral hearing on
the motion was conducted. In granting the prosecutor’s motion, the Trial Chamber stated
that the rights of the defendant would not be unduly affected and that notice was

42

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 28].

43

Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment, 16 November 1998. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook,
Tab 26].
44

Id. at 866. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 26].

45

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 26].

Prosecutor v. Delalic, Order on the Prosecution’s Motion for Leave to Call Additional Expert Witnesses
(Nov. 13, 1997). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 27].
46

10

advanced enough to give defendants adequate time to prepare their defense.47 It noted
that “the principle of iura novit curia does not prevent the Trial Chamber from being
addressed on certain matters of law by either of the parties.”48
b. The International Criminal Court
Under Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (the “Rules”) of the
International Criminal Court (the “ICC”) the prosecutor must provide the pre-trial
chamber with “a detailed description of the charges together with a list of evidence which
he or she intends to present at the hearing” no later than 30 days before the confirmation
hearing.49 However, Article 61(4) of the Rome Statute permits the prosecutor to amend
or withdraw any charges against the defendant as long as reasonable notice is given.50
According to the Rules, the defendant must be informed no later than 15 days before the
date of the hearing.51 Notice must include a list of the evidence the prosecutor intends to
present at the hearing.52
Prior to the trial, if the newly added charges are more “more serious” charges, the
pre-trial chamber may hold additional confirmation hearings on the new charges raised.53
Similar to the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC Statute provides that the defendant is “to be

47

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 27].

48

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 27].

49

U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000) [hereinafter referred to as ICC Rules of Procedure and
Evidence]. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 7].
50

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9 (1998)
[hereinafter referred to as the Rome Statute]. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 8].
51

ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, at Rule 120(4). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 7].

52

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 7].

53

Id. at Rule 128 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 7].
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informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge”54 and that
the defendant must be given “adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the
defence.”55
2. Other International Courts
a. The International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice (the “ICJ”) is the earliest authority for the
application of the iura novit curia principle in international proceedings. It was first used
in the Case of the S.S. Lotus, which concerned a collision between the Lotus, a French
mail steamer, and a Turkish collier on the high seas.56 As a result of this collision, eight
Turkish nationals were killed. The Lotus continued on to Constantinople.
Against objections by France, Turkish authorities arrested and charged the French
officer with manslaughter. After many demands by France and by special agreement
between France and Turkey, the case was referred to the ICJ. The ICJ was asked to
decide two issues: 1) Whether Turkey had jurisdiction to prosecute Demons under
principles of international law; and 2) Whether a principle of international law existed
that would have prohibited Turkey from prosecuting Demons. To both issues, the ICJ
answered in the negative.
France advanced three arguments in support of its positions; however, the ICJ
looked beyond the arguments raised by France for any other factors to support their

54

Rome Statute, art. 62(1)(a). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 8].

55

Id., art. 62(1)(b). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 8].

56

P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10 (1927) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 15]. Also note at the time
of this case, the ICJ was the Permanent Court of International Justice, which was established by the League
of Nations in 1922. It was replaced by the ICJ in 1946 when the United Nations was established. For the
purposes of this memorandum, it will be referred to as the ICJ at all times.

12

contentions. In doing so, the ICJ stated it “has not confined itself to a consideration of
the arguments put forward[.]”57 It also “included in its researches all precedents,
teachings and facts to which it had access and which might possibly have revealed the
existence of one of the principles of international law contemplated in the special
agreement.”58
b. The European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights applies the civil law principle of iura novit
curia and has done so on numerous occasions. According to the European Convention,
the function of the European Court is to ensure that contracting parties to the Convention
observe their commitments under it.59 Therefore, even if the European Commission on
Human Rights (the “Commission”) did not bring to the Court’s attention a violation of
certain provision of the Convention, the ECHR, upon its own initiative, may find
violations not brought before it by the parties.
In Lawless v. Ireland, the European Court stated that its duties under Article 19
required it to determine whether Ireland violated Article 15 of the Convention even
though neither the Commission nor the Irish government made reference to it in their
submissions to the European Court. 60 Article 19 states that the function of the European

57

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 15].

58

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 15].

59

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, No. 4, 1950, Eur. T.S. No 5,
art. 19 (1050) [hereinafter referred to as the European Convention]. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook, Tab 2].
“Whereas, although neither the Commission nor the Irish Government have referred to this provision in
the proceedings, the function of the Court, which is to ensure the observance of the engagements
undertaken by the Contracting Parties in the Convention (Article 19 of the Convention) (art. 19), requires it
to determine proprio motu whether this condition has been fulfilled in the present case.” 1 Eur. H.R. Rep.
15, 40 (ser. A) (1961). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 24].
60
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Court is to ensure that the parties to the European Convention observe their contractual
obligations.61 Article 15 permits states to derogate from specific provisions of the
Convention during times of emergency.62
Lawless was arrested and charged for being a member of the Irish Republican
Army, an unlawful organization, and with illegal possession of incriminating documents
in violation of Irish law. He initiated proceedings with the Commission alleging that his
detention was in violation of several provisions of the Convention. In order to accurately
determine whether Lawless’s detention was in violation of the Convention, the European
Court examined whether it was justified under Article 15 of the Convention.63 Based
upon the European Court’s assessment of Ireland’s Article 15 right to derogate from
certain provisions, it held that Lawless’s detention was justified.64
Not only may the European Court review violations of Articles of the Convention
that the Commission does not bring to its attention, it may also review provisions that the
Commission has deemed inadmissible. According to the ECHR in Handyside v. United

“To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the present
Convention, there shall be set up: (1) A European Commission of Human Rights hereinafter referred to as
'the Commission'; (2) A European Court of Human Rights.” European Convention, supra note 59, at art.
19. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 2].
61

“(1) In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting
Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under international law. (2) No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting
from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision. (3)
Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary-General of
the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall
also inform the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate
and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.” Id. at art. 15. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook, Tab 2].
62

63

Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) No. 3, para. 40 (1961). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab
24].
64

Id. at 38. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 24].
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Kingdom, the European Court has jurisdiction to examine allegations that arise from the
facts of the case referred to it even if they had been previously declared inadmissible by
the Commission. 65
Handyside lodged a complaint with the Commission and argued that his rights
under Articles 1, 7, 9, 10, 13, and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
were violated.66 The Commission accepted the application regarding Article 10 of the
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and specifically denied the admissibility of
the remaining Articles under which he alleged violations.67 The Commission later stated
that it would admit Article 18 as well.68
The European Court agreed with the Commission that many of the Articles pled
in the complaint were not relevant. However, contrary to the Commission’s declaration
that Article 14 was inadmissible, the European Court held that it was admissible. It
stated:
[T]he provisions of the Convention and of the Protocol form a whole; once
a case is duly referred to it, the Court may take congnisance of every
question of law arising in the course of the proceedings and concerning
facts submitted to its examination by a Contracting State or by the
Commission. Master of the characterization to be given in law to these
fact, the Court is empowered to examine them, if it deems it necessary and
if need be ex officio, in light of the Convention and the Protocol as a
whole.

65

Handyside, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 24 (1976) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 22].

66

Id. at 36. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 22].

67

Id. at 37. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 22].

68

Id. at 41. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 22].
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Ultimately, the European Court did not find a violation of Article 14, yet it considered
whether there was a violation despite the Commission’s rejection of the application of
that Article as “manifestly ill-founded.”69
The application of the iura novit curia principle in the European Court was
further explained in Guerra v. Italy 70 and Contrada v. Italy.71 Both cases deal
specifically with allegations submitted to the European Court that were not alleged in the
initial applications, yet they were decided differently. The European Court’s
determination in these cases is illuminating regarding how and under what circumstances
the principle is applied.
In Guerra, the Italian government failed to provide the local population with
information about risks associated with a nearby chemical plant. This failure to inform
was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, which states that “[e]veryone has the
right . . . to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers.”72 The only question presented to the Commission
was whether there was violation of Article 2 (dealing with the right to life) and Article
10. Two members of the Commission reasoned that the case could also be analyzed
under Article 8 of the Convention, which provides that everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life and home without the interference of public authorities.73
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At the hearing and before the European Court, the applicants relied on Articles 2
and 8 of the Convention.74 The government argued that the complaints under Articles 2
and 8 fell outside the compass of the case because it was confined to the decision on
admissibility given by the Commission.75 The European Court responded that:
[the Court] is the master of the characterization to be given in law to the
facts of the case, it does not consider itself bound by the characterization
given by an applicant, a government or the Commission. By virtue of the
jura novit curia principle, it has, for example, considered of its own
motion complaints under Articles or paragraphs not relied on by those
appearing before it and even under a provision in respect of which the
Commission had declared the complaint to be inadmissible while
declaring it admissible under a different one. A complaint is characterized
by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments
relied on.76
The European Court declared that its jurisdiction is determined by the decision on
admissibility of the application, which is determined by the Commission.77
However, the European Court “may deal with any issue of fact or law that arises
during the proceedings before it.”78
The applicants did not expressly ground their cases in Article 8 and Article 2, nor
were they submitted in the proceedings before the Commission.79 The European Court
nevertheless had jurisdiction to considered them because they “were closely connected
with the [grounds] pleaded, namely that giving information to the applicants, all of whom
74
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lived barely a kilometre from the factory, could have had a bearing on their private and
family life and their physical integrity.”80 The European Court held that the Italian
government violated Article 8.81
The applicant in Contrada was a senior police officer accused of involvement in
mafia-type organizations in violation of Italian law. A warrant for his arrest was issued
based on the statements of former mafia members who cooperated with the authorities.
On November 4, 1994 Contrada submitted an application to the Commission, where he
alleged violations of Articles 5(1)(c) claiming that his arrest was unlawful; 5(3) because
the length of his detention was too long; 6(1) because the length of the proceedings were
too long; 6(2) on the basis that his right to be presumed innocent were violated; and
Articles 16 and 17 as a result of the aforementioned Articles. However, in his final
submissions to the European Court, Contrada requested it to find violations of Article 3,82
based on the solitary conditions of his detention, and Article 5(1)(c) and 5(3).
The Commission held the Article 5(1)(c) allegation as inadmissible but noted
“that although Mr. Contrada complained from the outset that he been detained for an
unreasonable period (Article 5 § 3), the complaint under Article 3 concerns the actual
conditions of detention, not its length.”83 Contrada relied on Guerra to support his final
submission to the European Court of Article 3 although he did not raise the allegation
before the Commission. He argued that the European Court could exercise jurisdiction
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over the Article 3 alleged violation because it was closely connected to the alleged
violation of Article 5(3) as a result of his long detention period.84 The European Court
disagreed and held that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the Article 3 violation
because, even though both Articles concerned Contrada’s deprivation of liberty, the
Article 3 violation was identical to the one already declared inadmissible by the
Commission.85 Therefore, to consider the Article 3 violation would be tantamount to a
new complaint that is unconnected to the Article 5(3) allegation.86
The case law of the ECHR demonstrates three ways that it applies the iura novit
curia principle. First, Lawless indicates that the European Court may review possible
violations of the Convention sua sponte.87 Second, the ECHR could review alleged
violations of articles that were previously deemed inadmissible by the Commission as
was done in Handyside.88 Third, according to Guerra, the European Court permits the
parties to raise additional allegations before it even if they were not submitted to the
Commission for review. In Guerra the European Court stated that if the newly submitted
allegation is not closely connected to those submitted in the complaint to the
Commission, the European Court could deem it inadmissible, as it stated in Contrada.
These cases demonstrate that the European Court is not bound to examine violations not
raised by the parties.
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c. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights also adheres to the principle of iura
novit curia to make “use of the powers inherent to its judicial function.”89 The InterAmerican Court has stated that under that principle “the Court is not restricted to the
legal arguments of the parties, since clarification of the factual aspects often depends on
the parties’ actions.”90
Like the European Court, the Inter-American Court is not bound by the findings
of the Inter-American Commission. For example, in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,91 the
“Commission did not specifically allege [a] violation of Article 1(1)92 of the Convention”
but the Inter-American Court was not precluded from applying it.”93 According to the
Inter-American Court, Article 1(1):
constitutes the generic basis of the protection of the rights recognized by
the Convention and would be applicable, in any case, by virtue of a
general principle of law, iura novit curia, on which international
jurisprudence has repeatedly relied and under which a court has the power
and the duty to apply the juridical provisions relevant to a proceeding,
even when the parties does not expressly invoke them.94
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Similarly, in the Durand and Ugarte Case the Inter-American Court was asked to
decide whether the petitioners’ rights to be free from arbitrary deprivation of life
were violated.95 In its decision, the Inter-American Court also looked into
whether petitioners’ rights to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment or treatement during detention had also been violated even though the
issue was not submitted to the court by the Commission or the parties. Although
the Inter-American Court ultimately did not find a violation of petitioners’ rights
during detention, it stated that it was not precluded from examining that issue
because of the general principal of iura novit curia. The Inter-American Court
noted that the principle of iura novit curia is “used repeatedly by the international
jurisdiction in the sense that a judge is entitled and even has the obligation to
implement the corresponding legal dispositions in a proceeding, even when the
parties are not explicitly invoked.”96
3. Conclusion
The European Court has explicitly declared that, in its review, it is not bound by
the legal arguments put before it. Therefore, if a complainant fails to argue a violation of
an article of the Convention, the judges, at their discretion, may review any other articles
and find a violation of articles not pled based on the facts presented in the complaint.
The European Court is also not bound to the findings of the Commission and has wide
discretion whether it will or will not exercise the principle of iura novit curia. Though it
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may advance arguments that neither party has raised based on the facts, it does not feel
bound to do so.
The Inter-American Court goes further than the European Court regarding the
application of the principle of iura novit curia in that it is obligated to review possible
violations of the Inter-American Convention that were not raised by the parties. Further,
it may do so even when the Commission has declared a specific provision inadmissible.
B. NATIONAL COURTS
1. Civil Law Systems
Courts in civil law countries have broad powers to determine applicable law in
cases due to the role that judges play. The role of judges in civil law countries like
France and Germany are similar to that of the “prosecutor or the investigating magistrate
during the preliminary investigation, i.e., to investigate and determine the truth.”97 Civil
law systems are inquisitorial and therefore it is the duty of the judge to “take all measures
which he believes are useful to uncover the truth.”98 Part of the process requires the
judge to decide the applicable law that should be applied to the facts. In fact, “in [civil
law] countries the principle iura novit curia (the court is expected and required to
establish the law, while the facts must be proved by the parties) prevails.”99
a. Germany
In Germany, Section 264 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the judge to
apply the principle of iura novit curia. This section states that “[t]he court is not bound
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by the classification of the act on which the order opening the main proceeding is
based.”100 Section 265 elaborates on this principle and provides that the court may
change the legal classification of the charges against the accused, but it must first advise
the accused of the change so as to properly prepare his defense. 101 The defendant may
only be convicted of the crime with which he is charged; however, if the court decides to
change the legal classification of the charge he must be given the opportunity to prepare
his defense against the changed classification. Section 265(I) states:
The defendant cannot be convicted on the basis of a criminal law other
than the law cited in the judicially admitted public charge without having
first been especially advised of the change in the legal classification and
without having been afforded an opportunity to defend himself.

If the penalty to which the accused is exposed is greater because of a change in legal
classification, the court must first give the accused notice and permit him to prepare his
defense accordingly. 102 If the accused finds that more time is needed to prepare his
defense for a new and more serious crime, he may make a motion to postpone the trial.103
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The court may postpone the trial sua sponte if it believes the defense needs more time to
prepare as a result of a recharacterization of the facts.104
b. France
The procedure in France is similar to that in Germany. According to Article
283(1) of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, if the president of the assize court –
the highest criminal court in France –finds, prior to trial, that the original charges are
incomplete or that new elements have been revealed, he may order further investigation
into the facts.105 This is not problematic because the case against the accused has not
begun. Once proceedings begin, the competence of the assize court in felony cases is
fixed by a decree of remand by the indicting chamber if it is a final decree.106 The decree
of remand, even when final, does not limit the court’s power to add aggravating charges
or to give a different legal characterization of the facts presented.107 Article 350 reads:
If one or more aggravating circumstances not mentioned in the decree of
remand appear during the trial the president shall pose one or more special
questions.
Article 251 reads:
If it appears from the trial that the act admits of a legal qualification other
than that given it by the decree of remand of the president ought to pose
one or more subsidiary questions [to the jury].

“In other instances the court shall, upon motion or upon its own motion, also postpone the main trial if
this appears appropriate for sufficient preparation of the prosecution or the defense because of the changes
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These two articles indicate that the severity of the crime may be increased by
aggravating circumstances and that the court may make a different legal
classification at the end of the trial based on the same facts. In that case, there is
no notice given to the defendant. Instead, the president of the court submits
questions to the jury pertaining to the aggravating circumstances and/or the
different legal characterization to determine guilt.
c. Italy
In Italy the court is empowered to give a different legal definition of the facts than
those in the original charge as long as the different legal definition of the crime is within
the jurisdiction of that court.108 When the facts at trial remain unchanged, the court is not
bound by the legal classification and may find a crime more serious than the one charged.
In this situation, the court is not required to advise the accused.109 Should the court find
the facts “are different from those set out in the indictment, or if the Prosecutor sets forth
a new charge, the court must return the file to the Prosecutor and enable the accused to
prepare his defence.”110
2. Common Law Systems
a. United Kingdom
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In England, Section 6(3) of the Criminal Law Act of 1967 states:
Where, on a person's trial on indictment for any offence except treason or
murder, the jury finds him guilty of the offence specifically charged in the
indictment, but the allegations in the indictment amount to or include
(expressly or by implication) an allegation of another offence falling
within the jurisdiction of the court of trial, the jury may find him guilty of
that other offence or of an offence of which he could be found guilty on an
indictment specifically charging that other offence111
Therefore, the jury may convict a suspect of a lesser included offense even if it was not
specifically pled in the indictment. It may also convict the defendant of other offenses
that were not pled in the indictment. For example, the defendant in R v. Mandair112 was
charged with “causing” grievous bodily harm with intent but the jury was instructed that
it could find him guilty of the lesser included offense of “inflicting” grievous bodily
harm. The defendant was found guilty of the lesser offense.
On appeal Mandair argued that the jury should have been instructed on the
elements of the lesser offense because “causing” and “inflicting” are different elements.
Writing the opinion for the court, Lord Mackay held that the word “‘cause’ . . . is wide
enough to include any action that could amount to inflicting grievous bodily harm . . .
where the word ‘inflict’ appears as an alternative to ‘wound.’”113 Therefore, no
instruction was necessary and an alternative verdict was proper. The language of Section
6(3) of the Criminal Law Act specifically permits a conviction on a lesser included
offense even if it was not pled in the indictment and Mandair exemplifies this principle.
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More recently, however, it has been held that a defendant may not be charged
with a summary offense (an offense considered a “petty” offense) if it was not pled in the
indictment.

In R v. Heath, the defendant was charged with two counts of racially

aggravated assault.114 During jury instructions, the judge instructed the jury on the two
counts set in the indictment and also informed the jury they could convict the defendant
with an alternative verdict on an offense that was not pled in the indictment.115 The jury
acquitted the defendant of the two counts of racially aggravated assault but found him
guilty of common assault.116 On appeal, the court quashed the conviction and held that a
defendant could not be found guilty of a lesser summary offense of common assault
unless it was already in the indictment or added to the indictment.117
b. United States
In the United States, Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (the
“Rules of Criminal Procedure”) states that a complaint must include the facts that
constitute the offense with which the defendant is charged.118 Once the defendant is
charged, the indictment is presented to the grand jury,119 which is responsible for
examining the evidence and issuing indictments for the crimes alleged.120 The purpose of
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the grand jury is to protect the accused from “mistaken and vindictive prosecutions” and
to “ensure that no person is charged on evidence insufficient to justify a prosecution.”121
Early U.S. case law on this subject focused on the right of the grand jury to indict;
however, implicit is the right of the accused to be informed of all the charges against him.
If the grand jury decides that there is enough evidence to indict the accused, in the
absence of a guilty plea, the case is set for trial. According to Rule 7(3), the prosecutor
may amend the indictment any time before the verdict of the grand jury if there is an
addition or different offense charged.122
At trial, the prosecutor’s case may only be based on the charges that were
presented to the grand jury. In delivering a verdict, the jury may only be instructed on
the crimes alleged. Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that a
defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged
or of an attempt to commit the offense the charged.123 Therefore, if an offense is not
charged in the indictment, but it is necessarily included in the crime with which the
defendant was charged, the grand jury may convict on a lesser charge without amending
the indictment. This is because the defendant had notice of the elements of the crime
charged and could properly prepare his defense. Further, a defendant may be convicted
of an “attempt to commit an offense necessarily included in the offense charged, if the
attempt is an offense in its own right.”124 However, a defendant may not be convicted of
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a more serious crime or a crime with different elements after the grand jury indictment,
even if the prosecutor were to amend the indictment.
i. Historical Underpinnings
In Ex Parte Bain, the U.S. Supreme Court (the “Court”) was asked to decide
whether, by order of the court or on the request of the prosecuting attorney, an indictment
could be amended without resubmitting it to the grand jury for their approval.125 The
Court held that indictments may not be amended without reassembling the grand jury
unless a statute permitted otherwise.126
The petitioner in Bain was charged with violating federal law for making a false
report or statement as a cashier of a national bank.127 The original indictment charged
that the false statements made by petitioner were made “‘with an intent to deceive the
Comptroller of the Currency and the agent appointed to examine the affairs of said
association . . . [.]’”128 Thirteen months after presentment to the grand jury, by motion of
the United States, the court ordered an amendment to strike out the words “‘the
Comptroller of the Currency and.’”129 Bain was found guilty based upon that indictment.
The Supreme Court held that was not permissible.

It reasoned that:

if it lies within the province of a court to change the charging part of an
indictment to suit its own notions of what it ought to have been, or what
the grand jury would probably have made it been, or what the grand jury
would probably have made it if their attention had been called to
suggested changes, the great importance which the common law attaches
125
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to an indictment by a grand jury, as a prerequisite to a prison’s trial for a
crime, and without which the Constitution says “no person shall be held to
answer,” may be frittered away until its value is almost destroyed.130
The Court set aside the judgment against Bain because he was not actually charged with
the crime upon which the grand jury indicted him.
ii. Recent Developments
More recently, in Stirone v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a
defendant may not be convicted of an offense if it was not charged in the indictment.131
Petitioner was convicted for interfering with interstate commerce in violation of the
Hobbs Act.132 The indictment alleged that Stirone unlawfully imported sand into
Pennsylvania to be used in a steel plant. During the trial, however, the judge permitted
the government to introduce evidence that Stirone also interfered with steel shipments
from a Pennsylvania plant into Michigan and Kentucky. The jury was instructed that it
could convict Stirone if it found that he interfered with the interstate commerce of sand or
steel.133
The trial court did not permit an amendment to the indictment.134 However, the
Suprem Court held that because the trial court permitted the introduction of evidence
steel shipments – which was not pled in the indictment – it was effectively the same as an
amendment to the indictment.135 The essential elements that must be proven for a
130

Id. at 10. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 19].

131

361 U.S. 212 (1960). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 34].

132

Id. at 213. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 34].

133

Id. at 218. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 34].

134

Id. at 217. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 34].

135

Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 34].

30

violation of the Hobbs Act are interference with interstate commerce and extortion.136
The Court found that interference with interstate commerce – whether by sand or steel –
was crucial because it was the element upon which the government’s jurisdiction
depended.137 The addition of steel impermissibly broadened the charges mid-trial in
violation of Bain.138 According to the Court, Bain “stands for the rule that a court cannot
permit a defendant to be tried on charges that are not made in the indictment against
him.”139 Since the interference with only one type of commerce was charged – sand – the
conviction must be grounded only upon that charge “even though it be [sic] assumed that
under an indictment drawn in general terms a conviction might rest upon a showing that
commerce of one kind or another had been burdened.”140
Amendments to indictments without resubmitting to the grand jury are permitted;
however, a change in an indictment must not “‘change the crime charged, nor unfairly
surprise the defendants, nor create an opportunity for the government to prosecute the
defendants again for substantially the same offense.’”141 An amendment is permitted if
there is no change to a material or essential element of the charge so that the defendant is
prejudiced.142 A material or essential element is “one whose specification with precise
136
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accuracy is necessary to establish the very illegality of the behavior and thus the court’s
jurisdiction.”143 Therefore, an indictment may not be amended if it interferes with a
defendant’s right 1) to be informed of the charges against him so as to prepare his defense
and not be taken by surprise, or 2) to be protected against another prosecution for the
same offense.144
iii. The Greater Includes the Lesser
In United States v. Miller, the grand jury indictment alleged violations of mail
fraud, claiming that Miller had defrauded his insurance company by lying about the value
of his loss in a burglary that he consented to in advance.145 The trial focused primarily on
whether Miller possessed the property he claimed was stolen and whether he inflated the
value of his actual loss.146 Although the government moved to strike the part of the
indictment pertaining to prior knowledge of the burglary, Miller objected to the change
and the full indictment was submitted to the jury.147 The jury found Miller guilty of
inflating his losses. On appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated his conviction.148
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Miller’s exaggeration of the amount of his claimed loss even though it had concluded that an indictment
could be returned based on the overall scheme involving a use of the mail caused by Miller’s knowing
consent to the burglary.” Id. at 134, citing U.S. v. Miller, 715 U.S. 1360 (9th Cir. 1983). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook, Tab 35].
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In overruling the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the indictment
“clearly set forth a number of ways in which the acts alleged constituted [mail fraud]
violations.”149 As a result, Miller was given notice that he would have to defend against
the allegation that he overinflated his loss to his insurance company; hence, there was no
prejudice to him.150 The Court held:
As long as the crime and elements of the offense that sustain the
conviction are fully and clearly set out in the indictment, the right to a
grand jury is not normally violated by the fact that the indictment alleges
more crimes or other means of committing the same crime.151
The Court reviewed Bain’s propositions that: 1) A conviction may not stand if it
is based on an offense that is different than what was alleged in the grand jury’s
indictment; and 2) an indictment is invalidated when parts of it are struck out
because courts may not speculate on whether the grand jury meant for the
remaining offense to stand independently.152 Upon review, the Court overruled
Bain’s second proposition insofar as an allegation charged in the indictment may
not be deleted without invalidating the entire indictment, but upheld Bain’s
general position that additions to offenses alleged in the indictment are
impermissible.153
iv. Lesser Included Offenses
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Id. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 35]. “Competent defense counsel certainly should
have been on notice that that offense was charged and would need to be defended against.” Id. at 135.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook, Tab 35].
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The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a defendant may be found guilty of
(1) an offense necessarily included in the offense charged; (2) an attempt to commit the
offense charged; or (3) an attempt to commit an offense necessarily included in the
offense charged, if the attempt is an offense in its own right.154
In determining whether an offense is a lesser included offense of the one charged,
the Supreme Court has adopted the “elements test.”155 An offense is included in another
offense if the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the greater
offense.156 In Schmuck v. United States the Court stated that if the prosecutor could
“request an instruction on an offense whose elements were not charged in the indictment,
this right of notice would be placed in jeopardy.”157
v. Sentencing Factors Versus Elements of a Crime
In Wooley v. United States, Wooley was arrested and his indictment charged him
with intent to distribute heroin, but the evidence at trial proved that the substance was
cocaine.158 The trial court did not permit a formal amendment to the indictment, but
permitted the government to proceed on the indictment as it was “‘with the understanding
that what is charged is cocaine, not heroin.’”159 The jury convicted Wooley on the
evidence presented and Wooley appealed, claiming that it was an impermissible
constructive amendment to the indictment.
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The issue presented to the court of appeals was whether an element in the
indictment was changed to a different element at trial.160 The court held that:
a change in characterizing the element from its expression in the
indictment to its presentation at trial will be an amendment, not a mere
variance, when the court cannot be sure from the indictment that the grand
jury received facts – material to conviction on an element of the crime –
which the petit jury received and could use to convict.161
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision because it concluded that 1) a
grand jury’s decision to indict for heroin and cocaine are different and 2) “a criminal
defendant is entitled to be tried for what the grand jury said on the basis of what it was
told, not tried for what the grand jury might have done if it had been told something
else.”162 Therefore, if the facts proved at trial are different than in the indictment, but the
elements are unchanged, the charges may be dismissed if there is prejudice to the
defendant.
The case law is unambiguous that the charges against an accused may not be
broadened, nor can elements in the indictment be different than those charged at trial. In
some instances, however, there has been confusion about whether a fact is an element of
an offense which broadens the charge or merely a sentencing factor. In Jones v. U.S.163
the Court held that the difference between an element and a sentencing factor is that
former must be charged in the indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and
submitted to the jury and the latter does not. If a fact increases the penalty then it must be
considered an element.
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Jones was indicted for violation of aiding or abetting the use of a firearm during
and in relation to a crime of violence and carjacking or aiding or abetting carjacking.164
The indictment made a general reference to the statute, which included three
subsections,165 yet did not specifically reference any of the subsections and did not charge
any of the facts in the latter two subsections.166 The jury found Jones found guilty of
carjacking. The jury instructions defined the elements by using those in the main
paragraph of the statute and did not make reference to the three subsections.167
A conviction based upon the main paragraph carried a maximum 15-year
sentence.168 Prior to the sentencing hearing, the government recommended that Jones
receive a 25-year sentence for the carjacking because a victim suffered serious bodily
injury. Jones objected to the recommendation and argued that “serious bodily injury”
was an added element of the offense, which was not pled in the indictment nor submitted
to the jury.169 The subsection not only provided for more severe punishment, but it was
conditioned on more facts “that seem[ed] quite as important as the elements in the
principal paragraph”170 and therefore it was not merely a sentencing enhancement.171
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One year later the Supreme Court ruled that any fact that increases the penalty for
crimes beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.172 In Apprendi, petitioner was convicted under a New Jersey
statute for firing shots into the home of an African American family and found guilty of
the crime of possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.173 The statute provided a
punishment of 5 to 10 years; however, a hate crimes statute provided that a judge may
extend a second-degree offense from 10 to 20 years if the crime was motivated by racial
bias.174 Apprendi was sentenced to a 12-year prison term.175
Apprendi argued that he was not motivated by a racial bias but the trial judge
found that Apprendi committed his crime with “with a purpose to intimidate’ as provided
by the statute” and therefore the hate crime sentencing enhancement statute applied.176
Because the trial judge considered the hate crimes statute as a sentencing enhancement, it
was not submitted to a jury and required only that it be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence.177

The New Jersey state supreme court rejected Apprendi’s arguments;

however, the Supreme Court took note of its decision in Jones and held that “‘under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum
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penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.’”178
III. CONCLUSION
Although the regional systems such as the European Court and the InterAmerican Court apply the principle of iura novit curia in their proceedings, it should be
noted that defendants in these regional systems are states and not individuals. Therefore,
should the defendants be found liable of violating their respective conventions, there is no
jeopardy of an individual’s rights being infringed because defendants under the European
Court and Inter-American Court are not individuals. Even if the defendant state is
‘caught off guard’ by an argument not raised in its application to the court, there is no
penalty of imprisonment to an individual found in violation of the European Convention
or the Inter-American Convention. A typical ‘punishment’ for violations of the
conventions is damages to the complainant because the state defendants are charged with
violating the European Convention on Human Rights or Inter-American Convention on
Human Rights. These conventions are incorporated into the national legal systems and
are meant to protect the individuals within the states. In fact, the Trial Chamber in
Kupreskic specifically stated that “even though the iura novit curia principle is normally
applied in international judicial proceedings, under present circumstances it would be
inappropriate for this principle to be followed in proceedings before international
criminal courts, where the rights of an individual accused are at stake.”179
Although the principle of iura novit curia is applied in most civil law countries,
the judge will typically amend the indictment and give notice to the defendant if the facts
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are recharacterized in a way that the recharacterization adds a crime or changes the crime
with which the defendant was originally charged. In common law countries, the facts
may not be recharacterized or an additional crime charged if it was not in the original
indictment. A defendant in the United States or the United Kingdom may be convicted of
lesser included offenses. Common law systems permit convictions on lesser included
offenses even they were not charged because the elements are the same – the greater
offense necessarily includes the lesser offense. The greater offense charged in the
indictment is typically the same charge as the lesser offense within, except that the
greater crime charged has an additional element that may serve as an aggravating factor.
In such cases there is no notice problem or fair trial concerns as the defendant
presumably prepared his defense to answer to a more serious charge.
Interestingly, the issue presented in this memorandum deals with what the Trial
Chamber for the Special Court must or may do if the elements of a crime not charged
were satisfied beyond on a reasonable doubt. Most instructive on this issue is the
Kupreskic judgment because it has greater precedential value for the Special Court. Both
the Special Court and the ICTY are international criminal courts and both adhere to
principles of international criminal law. Moreover, the statutes and rules for the ICTY,
ICTR and Special court are all similar and the Special Court is governed by the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR. Since the ICTR also looks to the ICTY for
guidance in the interpretation of its own rules, the ICTY is instructive to the Special
Court.
Although the Trial Chamber in Kupreskic analyized the application of the
principle of iura novit curia in domestic criminal proceedings, it concluded that there is

39

“no general principle of criminal law common to all major legal systems of the world
[which] may be found.”180 The Trial Chamber stated that it was hesitant to apply the
principle of iura novit curia to international criminal proceedings at this time because
“international criminal rules are still in a rudimentary state.”181 Furthermore, to permit
the prosecutor to convict an accused of a crime with which he was not charged would
“violate Article 21(4) of the Statute, which provides that an accused shall be informed
‘promptly and in detail’ of the ‘nature and cause of the charge against him.’”182
The Trial Chamber specified outlined what it must do when the prosecutor has
failed to allege a crime that, at trial, it is demonstrated that the uncharged crime was
committed.
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Type of Crime Not
Charged
Different crime with
different elements
More serious offense
Lesser included offenses
(same elements)

Action Required by the Prosecutor or Trial Chamber
Prosecutor must request leave to amend
Prosecutor must request leave to amend
No amendment necessary but must give notice to
defendant

Seemingly, the only time the Trial Chamber may convict the defendant of an offense not
charged in the indictment is if it is a lesser included or underlying offense.
There is little support for the application of the principle of iura novit
curia in international criminal proceedings at this time. The ICTY, ICTR and the
Special Court specifically provide fair trial rights and safeguards to the accused
and the application of the principle would violate the rights of the accused.
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